

# **Inflection Point: Asian American Men, the Manosphere, and American Democracy**

**A report by the NAKASEC Network**



**NAKASEC**

## Acknowledgements

Special thanks to our generous donors and funders who made this project possible.

With deep appreciation for Dr. Tom Wong for conducting this survey and helping bring this information to light.

For our community members, affiliates and chapters, partners, funders, stakeholders, volunteers, and team members: Thank you for being here with us as we work for a future where we all belong.

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## About NAKASEC

NAKASEC was formed out of several different sociopolitical moments. Our founder, Han Bong Yoon, fled South Korea in 1981 after he was targeted by the country's military dictatorships for his leadership in efforts to democratize Korea. He continued to organize for Korean democracy once he arrived in the United States, galvanizing Korean Americans and establishing grassroots community-based organizations across the country. In 1994, recognizing the need for a progressive, unified Korean American voice that could advocate for Korean Americans in the United States and work in coalition with marginalized communities, the National Korean American Service and Education Consortium (NAKASEC) was born.

At NAKASEC, we root ourselves in our history and values with political education and cultural programs, and with many of our founders still involved. NAKASEC has affiliates across six states: Hamkae Center (Virginia), HANA Center (Illinois), MinKwon Center for Community Action (New Jersey, New York), Woori Center (Pennsylvania), and NAKASEC Texas (Texas). Our collective mission is to organize Korean and Asian Americans to achieve racial, social, and economic justice. Together, we project a national progressive Asian American voice in the fight for immigrant rights, and work together to advance progressive healthcare, education, and housing policies, and language access in our respective localities and states.



Dear Community,

As we bear witness to intentional efforts to erode democracy in the United States, we recognize the precariousness and importance of this moment. As we write this, the U.S. government has deployed the military to Washington D.C., California, Illinois, Oregon, and North Carolina to enforce its immigration agenda – with more locations on the horizon. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – now one of the largest militaries in the world – is terrorizing our communities: abducting people off the street, separating families, holding people indefinitely, and imprisoning people in third countries. Our taxpayer dollars are funding these injustices while multi-million-dollar corporations are profiting. And yet, none of this addresses the root causes of the most pressing issues Americans face: rapidly rising costs of housing, food, and healthcare; and the dismantling of social safety nets. Moreover, people are burned out, overwhelmed, and feel less powerful and impactful than ever.

Despite this, and arguably for the very purpose of addressing these bleak circumstances, organizations like NAKASEC continue to fight for a future where every person – citizen and non citizen alike, can thrive. One of our core tenets for systemic change is that we must cultivate power by growing a connected base of people who share similar values, and activate them to reach shared goals. Only by meeting people where they are, building deep relationships, and sustaining investments in our communities can we cultivate the people-power needed to save and strengthen our democracy and fulfill our goal of establishing a pathway to citizenship for all immigrants. To do this, **we must reach beyond our echo chamber and connect with members of our communities that we have not yet meaningfully engaged towards a shared vision.**

Despite this recognition, our social media followers have remained steadily disproportionate by gender, with significantly less men following our accounts. Our struggle to reach and connect with Asian American men impacts our base- and power-building efforts. When we spoke with several other organizations and influencers, we learned that this is a trend other communities are also experiencing. Thus, this survey was born from the questions: Where are Asian American men on social media? What content are they consuming? How can our network of organizations better reach and connect with Asian men?

The results of this survey are highly informative while also highlighting a worrisome reality: **We are at an inflection point.** The radicalization pipeline for Asian men is gaining traction and democracy is declining, spurred along by the manosphere and deep investments by the right. But there is still time to intervene – and we must. It is our hope that this study can be a model for practice rooted in a research and research rooted in practice. Protecting democracy, mitigating harm, and strengthening our rights remain tasks that requires us to reach broader swaths of our communities.

Thank you for being here with us.

In solidarity,

Becky Belcore and Jung Woo Kim  
NAKASEC Co-Directors

## Asian Americans Rising: Our Power and Impact

Asian Americans have reliably been seen as a progressive voice since the late 1990s, but new data suggests that the pendulum may be shifting among Asian men. Asian Americans remain the fastest-growing racial group and electorate in the United States. Our population has doubled in the past two decades, from 10 million in 2000 to an estimated 24.8 million in 2023. Now, Asian Americans comprise approximately 7% of the U.S. population, and **by 2040, 1 in 10 Americans will be Asian American.**<sup>[1]</sup> States such as California, Hawai'i, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Texas have the highest concentrations of Asian Americans, while communities are growing in battleground states like Pennsylvania and Virginia.

In 2024, there were an estimated 15 million Asian Americans who were eligible to vote, or about 6.1% of all eligible voters.<sup>[2]</sup> For the past three election cycles, Asian American voters have turned out in soaring numbers.

Despite our growing size and power, there remains little investment in the organizing of the Asian American community. Most mainstream surveys do not recognize Asians in our own category – let alone disaggregate data about groups within the Asian community. A lack of data doesn't discount the wisdom and insight of organizers and organizations on the ground, but it does emphasize the lack of investment and understanding of **the growing role Asian Americans can and will play in shaping our country's future.**

## The Erosion of Democracy and the Growing Threat of the Manosphere

Around the world, constitutional democracies are declining, and authoritarian populism is increasing. It's important to note that each country has its own unique and differing circumstances for this growing trend, but in the United States, we are experiencing a progressive deconstruction of American democracy by elected officials and their appointees. From attacks on elections, institutions, press, and the judicial and legislative branches of government; to the gutting of civil services and installment of loyalists, the pillars of American democracy are rapidly weakening.

After President Trump was re-elected to office in 2024, political analysts and organizations sought to understand the shift of voters that had elected President Biden in 2020. In 2024, **men shifted 15 points to the right** and supported Trump at higher rates than women. **One growing influence identified was the manosphere (PBS, Wired, Media Matters).** The manosphere is defined as a loosely connected constellation of online communities, influencers, and content creators who claim to address men's issues like dating, fitness, and fatherhood – and promote regressive views of masculinity and anti-feminism, and position men as victims.

[1] <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/05/01/key-facts-about-asians-in-the-us/>

[2] <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/01/10/key-facts-about-asian-american-eligible-voters-in-2024/>

## The Erosion of Democracy and the Growing Threat of the Manosphere (cont.)

Formerly considered a fringe of the internet, the manosphere is growing in size and influence. While people of all genders are experiencing social isolation and disconnection – so much so that in 2023, the U.S. Surgeon General declared it an epidemic<sup>[3]</sup>, the manosphere is providing its own answers: that feminism and the “feminization” of society are the cause of men’s problems, including loneliness. The solution, according to the manosphere? A return to patriarchal authority, rigid gender roles, and the normalization of violence.

These anti-feminist ideologies and values are fundamentally antithetical to democracy. Feminism has long been understood as a democratizing force, necessary to advancing the rights and opportunities of marginalized communities. The [United States' 2023 Strategy and National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security](#) “highlights that displays of misogyny online are linked to violent action... This includes recognizing misogyny—online or in policy—as an early indicator of authoritarian rise.”<sup>[4]</sup>

It’s important to note the concurrent increase in the number of men converting to Orthodox Christianity. As reported by the [BBC](#), the [New York Post](#), and the [Telegraph](#), the number of male converts to Orthodox Christianity has exploded since 2022. **The relationships between traditional religion, the manosphere, and authoritarianism cannot be overstated.** Per the [New York Times](#), “Echoing some of the rhetoric of the so-called manosphere, new waves of young converts say Orthodoxy offers them hard truths and affirms their masculinity.” As organizer and co-founder and Executive Director of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Century Initiative [Scot Nakagawa points out](#), “Social, cultural, and religious factors stemming from patriarchy combine to inform the construction of traditional masculinity where men perceive they are expected to enact authoritarian rule in the home and view women as inferior.” These views and values are formalized through structural systems of law and policy, increasing inequality and weakening democracy. “Authoritarian regimes systematically enshrine sexist policies including increased state control over women’s reproductive rights, criminalization of LGBTQ+ people, promotion of ‘traditional family’ structures where women are subservient to men, and laws making it difficult for women to participate fully in workforce and politics,” says Nakagawa.

It's clear that the manosphere is no longer “just” a fringe group: it is an emboldening threat to the well-being of modern society and the democratic values that strengthen it.

[3] <https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-social-connection-advisory.pdf>

[4] <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/11/gender-wars-are-an-early-warning-sign-for-authoritarianism.html>

## Connecting the dots: Asian American Men, the Manosphere, and the Rise of Authoritarianism


**This study found that an alarming 1 in 5 Asian men knowingly engage with manosphere content. 35% encounter manosphere content on their feed several times a week or more, even when not actively searching for it.**

Because conservatives are increasing their investments in digital platforms, influencers, and creators, we can anticipate that this exposure will only continue to grow. Media Matters found that already “the right dominates the online media ecosystem,” with nearly five times as many followers as left-leaning shows.<sup>[5]</sup> These realities increase the likelihood of repeated exposure, thereby increasing the normalization of violence and devaluation of feminism, women, and democracy.

Asian Americans – and Asian American men – as the fastest growing racial demographic and voting bloc, wield growing power in the direction of the country. As such, the participation of young Asian American men is critical to stop authoritarianism and protect and strengthen democracy.

**This study highlights the urgent need for intervention with Asian American men and the manosphere to preserve our democracy and protect and advance the rights of immigrants and marginalized communities.** To successfully intervene, we must meet these community members where they are, outreach to them in ways that are resonant, and build authentic relationships before they drift even further to the right. **Indeed, we are at an inflection point.**

This groundbreaking study takes a bold step forward in understanding the relationship between Asian American men, the manosphere, and the radicalization and extremist pipeline – and provides recommendations for intervention.



[5] <https://www.mediamatters.org/google/right-dominates-online-media-ecosystem-seeping-sports-comedy-and-other-supposedly>

## Study Methodology

Fielded in September 2025, Asian American men between 18-45 were identified from the L2 voter file. 685 respondents participated in the survey. The margin of error is +/- 3.71 percentage points. The survey was conducted online and in English. This survey is nationally representative, drawn from a random sample of young Asian men across the country.

Respondents were asked questions about their social media use and exposure and engagement with manosphere content. Before asking questions about their experiences with the manosphere, we first defined it: “The ‘manosphere’ is a loosely connected network of online communities, influencers, and content creators who focus on men’s issues, masculinity, dating, and gender dynamics. It includes a wide spectrum of content, ranging from fitness, self-help, and male mental health to more controversial topics like anti-feminism, traditional gender roles, and critiques of modern women and society.”

The average age of respondents was 30 years old. 88.3% reported voting in the 2024 election, with 64.2% voting for Harris, 15.1% voting for Trump, and 20.8% voting Other. 68.3% reported voting in the 2020 election, with 78.1% voting for Biden, 12.2% voting for Trump, and 9.8% voting Other. 61.7% feel closest to the Democratic Party, 5.0% the Republican Party, 25% Independent, and 8.3% Other. 10% describe themselves as Conservative or Very Conservative, 71.7% as Liberal or Very Liberal, and 18.3% Moderate.



## Key Findings

### **Asian men are consuming manosphere content.**

An alarming 1 in 5 young Asian men (20%) engage with manosphere content. Self-identified liberal respondents and self-identified conservative respondents are behaving in the ways that we would expect, and self-identified moderate young Asian men currently say “no” when it comes to manosphere content engagement. At this critical inflection point, increasing numbers of Asian men could be drawn into the manosphere unless there are significant interventions.

### **Asian men are not initially seeking manosphere content.**

Most young men do not initially seek out extremist content. Their searches start benign as they look for advice on health, fitness, and dating. The algorithm brings them to creators who speak on these issues – and promote manosphere ideologies. As Media Matters’ study of online influencers shows, conservative influencers heavily outweigh progressives – with almost five times as many views. 6 Social media algorithms are leading them to manosphere content, which is more prevalent than progressive content.

### **Young Asian men are consuming social media to understand themselves and the world.**

While the majority (61.7%) say social media is their main source of news, only one-quarter (25%) report using social media primarily to stay updated on current events or news. 80% of young Asian men somewhat or strongly agree that social media helps them better understand social issues and current events and 43.3% strongly or somewhat agree that social media helps them better understand the personal issues they are dealing with.

When asked why young Asian men engage with manosphere content, respondents said it was to “explore discussions of masculinity,” “hear perspectives on relationships,” “learn about self-improvement,” and “understand different viewpoints.”

The plurality of young Asian male men use social media 3-4 hours a day, with 56.7% of young Asian men using social media because it makes them feel connected to other people, and 36.7% somewhat or strongly agreeing that they have difficulty finding in-person spaces where they can be themselves.

On average, self-identified liberal Asian men follow issue-based content most, while self-identified moderate and conservative Asian men reported following primarily influencers and individuals.

### **Young Asian men feel ignored and isolated.**

When asked if they feel that society ignores the struggles of men and boys, 51.7% of respondents agreed, 26.7% disagreed, and 21.7% were neutral. About one-third of the respondents (36.7%) indicated they have difficulty finding in-person spaces where they can be themselves. These feelings of loneliness and isolation make this population more susceptible to manosphere content.

## Key Findings

**Young Asian men who engage with the manosphere are more likely to believe that social media can help them solve problems in their lives, are dissatisfied with their past/current romantic relationships, and feel more connected with people online than in real life.**

There are significant differences in points of view and experiences when it comes to manosphere content engagement. While 61.7% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree that they are satisfied with their past/current romantic relationships, the modal response among manosphere content consumers is strongly disagree – whereas the modal response among those who do not engage with the manosphere was strongly agree.

Roughly 1/3 of young Asian men strongly or somewhat agree that their closest relationships are with women, but the modal response among manosphere content consumers is strongly disagree. When asked if they agree or disagree with the statement that “Social media can help me solve problems in my life,” the majority of young Asian men said that they strongly disagree or somewhat disagree. However, the modal response among those who engage with the manosphere was somewhat agree, whereas the modal response among those who do not engage with the manosphere was somewhat disagree.

Also, when asked if they agree or disagree with the statement that “I feel more connected with people online than I do in real life,” the majority of young Asian men said that they strongly disagree or somewhat disagree. However, the modal response among those who engage with the manosphere was somewhat agree, whereas the modal response among those who do not engage with the manosphere was strongly disagree.

**Asian men are raised with traditional gender role expectations.**

The data shows that the majority (67%) of young Asian men share similar experiences when it comes to growing up in households where expressing emotions was discouraged and that as children, they felt pressured to “be a man” or “act tough.” Despite these shared childhood experiences, there is a clear divergence of values and ideologies that forms as they become adults. 77% indicated that their role models support traditional masculinity values such as emotional restraint, self-reliance and dominance.

**Portrayals of Asian men in media need improvement.**


Asian American men are emasculated through their frequent portrayal in media as foreigners, physically unattractive, socially inept, and asexual. Only 28.3% of young Asian men say that Asian men are portrayed very favorably or favorably in mainstream media, while 38.3% say they are portrayed poorly or very poorly. The majority of respondents do not feel Asian men are portrayed favorably in social media either. 71.6% strongly or somewhat agree that Asian men are often underrepresented or stereotyped in media and popular culture.

**Anti-immigrant sentiment is hurting Asian men.**

73.3% strongly or somewhat agree that Asian men are being hurt by anti-immigrant sentiment. Asian Americans are viewed as the perpetual foreigner, creating sentiments of exclusion and alienation from American society.


## Social Media Usage

What social media platforms do you have an account with? Please check all that apply



Note: the most common social media accounts among self-identified liberal voters is Instagram followed by YouTube; the most common social media accounts among self-identified moderate voters is Facebook followed by a tie between Instagram and YouTube; the most common social media accounts among self-identified conservative voters is a tie between Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube; the most common social media accounts among Manosphere content consumers is YouTube followed by a tie between Reddit and TikTok; the most common social media accounts among non-Manosphere content consumers is Instagram followed by YouTube.

Which of the following social media platforms do you use most often?



Note: the most common social media accounts among self-identified liberal voters is Instagram followed by YouTube; the most common social media accounts among self-identified moderate voters is Facebook followed by a tie between Instagram and YouTube; the most common social media accounts among self-identified conservative voters is a tie between Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube; the most common social media accounts among Manosphere content consumers is YouTube followed by a tie between Reddit and TikTok; the most common social media accounts among non-Manosphere content consumers is Instagram followed by YouTube.


## Social Media Usage

**Thinking about the social media platform that you use most often, how much time would you say you spend on this social media platform per day?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified moderates, self-identified conservatives, manosphere content consumers, and non-mansphere content consumers is 3-4 hours per day; the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is 1-2 hours per day.


**Which of the following is the main reason you use social media?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is “Staying updated on and understanding current events and news”; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is “Staying updated on the lives of people I know”; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is “Staying updated on and understanding current events and news”; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is a tie between “I like to zone out or distract myself” and “Learning a new skill or about a topic”; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is “Staying updated on the lives of people I know.”


## Social Media Usage

### What kind of content do you follow most on social media?



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is issue-based content; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is influencers and individuals; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is influencers and individuals; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is influencers and individuals; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is other.


### What is the main reason you follow a social media account?



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is “The content is interesting to me”; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is “The content is enjoyable to me”; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is “I want to stay updated on the topics of the account”; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is “The content is interesting to me”; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is “The content is interesting to me.”


## Social Media Usage

### Do you follow any organizations on social media?



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is no; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is no; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is yes.


### Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I prefer videos and short-form content (under 2 minutes) over graphics with a lot of words."



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is neither agree nor disagree.

## Social Media Usage

### Which of the following is your main source of news?



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal, moderate, conservative, manosphere content consumers, and non-mansphere content consumers is social media.

### Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “I use social media because it makes me feel connected to other people.”



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is a tie between strongly agree and neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is a tie between somewhat agree and neither agree nor disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is somewhat agree.


## Social Media Usage

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Social media helps me better understand the personal issues that I am dealing with.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is a tie between somewhat agree and somewhat disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is somewhat agree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is somewhat agree.


**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Social media helps me better understand social issues and current events.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is strongly agree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is somewhat agree.


## Social Media Usage

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Social media can help me solve problems in my life.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat disagree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is a tie between neither agree nor disagree and somewhat disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is a tie between somewhat agree and strongly agree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is somewhat disagree.


**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Accounts run by social justice organizations are more likely to share fake news.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is strongly disagree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is strongly agree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is strongly agree; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is strongly disagree.

## Manosphere Engagement

**How often do you encounter "manosphere" content on your social media even when not actively searching for it?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is rarely; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is several times a week; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is several times a day; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is several times a day; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is rarely.


**Do you view, like, share, comment, or otherwise engage with "manosphere" content on social media?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is no; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is no; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is yes; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is yes; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is no.


## Manosphere Engagement

**What is the main reason you view, like, share, comment, or otherwise engage with "manosphere" content on social media?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is to understand different viewpoints...; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is for entertainment or curiosity; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is to hear perspectives on relationships...

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Manosphere" social media platforms are more legitimate than traditional media sources."**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is strongly disagree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is somewhat agree.


## Emotional Connections and Relationships

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “I feel satisfied with my past/current romantic relationships”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is strongly agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is a tie between somewhat agree and neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is strongly disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is strongly disagree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is strongly agree.


**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “I feel more connected to people online than I do in real life.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is strongly disagree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is strongly disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is a tie between somewhat agree and somewhat disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is strongly disagree.


## Emotional Connections and Relationships

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “My closest relationships (romantic and non-romantic) are with women.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is strongly disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is strongly disagree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is neither agree nor disagree.


**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “I have difficulty finding in-person spaces where I can be myself.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is somewhat disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is somewhat disagree.


## Traditional Masculinity and Childhood Experiences

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Men who assert dominance are more successful in life.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat disagree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is a tie between somewhat agree and somewhat disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is somewhat agree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is somewhat disagree.

**Were male role models in your life supportive of traditional masculinity values such as emotional restraint, self-reliance, and dominance?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is yes; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is yes; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is yes.

## Traditional Masculinity and Childhood Experiences

**Did you grow up in a household where expressing emotions was discouraged?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is yes; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is yes; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is yes.

**As a child, did you feel pressure to “be a man” or “act tough”?**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is yes; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is yes; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is yes; the modal response among non-mansphere content consumers is yes.

## Public Image and Impact

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “I feel that society ignores the struggles of men and boys.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is strongly agree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is strongly agree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree.

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Asian men are being hurt by anti-immigrant sentiment.”**



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is strongly agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is strongly agree.


## Public Image and Impact

### How do you feel that Asian men are portrayed in mainstream media today?



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is neither favorably nor poorly; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is a tie between favorably and poorly; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is neither favorably nor poorly; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is favorably; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is poorly.


### How do you feel that Asian men are portrayed in social media today?



Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is neither favorably nor poorly; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is favorably; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is neither favorably nor poorly; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is favorably; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is poorly.

## Public Image and Impact

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Asian men are often underrepresented or stereotyped in media and popular culture.”**




Note: the modal response for self-identified liberal voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified moderate voters is somewhat agree; the modal response for self-identified conservative voters is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response among manosphere content consumers is neither agree nor disagree; the modal response among non-manosphere content consumers is somewhat agree.

## Demographics and Political Choices

Did you vote in the 2024 presidential election?



Who did you vote for in the 2024 presidential election?



Did you vote in the 2020 presidential election?




Who did you vote for in the 2020 presidential election?




## Demographics and Political Choices

### Which political party do you feel closest to?



### How would you describe yourself politically?



## Recommendations For Intervention, Base-Building, and Long-Term Change

73% of young Asian male self-identified liberal and moderates said “yes” when it comes to following organizations on social media. This means that lanes do exist for organizations like NAKASEC to capture the attention of, engage with, and build relationships with young Asian men, including those who can be persuaded toward more democratic values. Towards this, NAKASEC’s recommendations are as follows:

### **Invest in outreach and education strategies that may appeal to young Asian men, including podcasts, video games, and long-form content.**

To effectively counter the manosphere and build broader bases, it will be critical to increase the presence of diverse voices where Asian men often are: in digital spaces. Podcasts, video games, and streaming are becoming increasingly popular with this population. With all ranging from 1 to over 3 hours, it’s clear that there is some appetite for long-form content. These mediums should focus on content that young Asian men have identified as important to them such as financial management, fitness, and dating and relationships.

**Invest in communications capacity to create diverse content for different platforms, support partnerships with influencers and artists, and test different methods and messages.** As the data shows that young Asian men who are self-identified moderates and manosphere consumers are most likely to follow influencers or individuals on social media, this suggests that short-form videos or graphics featuring influencers or individuals delivering political content could be resonant. Communications and organizing are interdependent in creating connection, building relationships, and growing a diverse base of community members – and investments should be made to support diverse tactics and strategies.

### **Create diverse content that is not (always) explicitly political.**

As only one-quarter of young Asian men are using social media primarily to stay updated on current events or news, delivering political content in non-political and subtle ways could better reach and appeal to young Asian men.

### **Conduct message testing to test the effectiveness of various messages with young Asian men.**

It is worthwhile to test different messages with young Asian men to better understand what resonates, persuades, and/or mobilizes them.

**Create and test different ads to target Asian men.** Create and test unique messaging dependent on platform and target audience. For example, Instagram is more likely to reach young Asian men who are liberal or moderate – which suggests mobilization messaging. However, YouTube or Facebook are more likely to reach young Asian men who are conservative, suggesting persuasion messaging.

## Recommendations For Intervention, Base-Building, and Long-Term Change

### **Invest in additional research on the relationship between the manosphere and Asian men.**

This survey does not account for the fluidity of gender identity or sexual identity, and was only conducted in English. It would be worthwhile to conduct research to disaggregate for sexual and gender identities, ethnic identities, and to widen accessibility by including languages other than English. More research is needed to better understand the complex experiences of Asian Americans. The term “Asian American” encompasses vastly different subgroups, with roots in over 40 countries with more than 800 languages and dialects, and differences in the reasons and ways in which Asians migrated to the United States.

### **Invest in community organizing and organizers.**

Building deep, trusting relationships takes time – and people. Diverse organizers can reach different groups of people within diverse communities and better meet young Asian men where they truly are, instead of where we want them to be.

### **Create spaces to foster connection and community.**

These do not need to be explicitly political or men-only events and can be a combination of in-person and digital. Create and hold regular spaces where community members can attend and feel part of a larger community. Suggestions include interest nights like game nights, Happy Hours, financial literacy, fitness and health, or sports-watching events. Rather than focusing on political education or mobilization, these spaces can focus on creating spaces for authentic engagement and relationship-building, which ultimately leads to base-building and organizing opportunities.





The National Korean American Service & Education Consortium (**NAKASEC**)’s mission is to organize Korean and Asian Americans to achieve social, economic, and racial justice. The NAKASEC Network is **HANA Center** (Illinois), **Hamkae Center** (Virginia), **Woori Center** (Pennsylvania), **MinKwon Center for Community Action** (New York & New Jersey) and **NAKASEC Texas** (Texas).

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